Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 1 Vol. 23: No. 1 (Winter 2018)

Article 4

Winter 2018

U.S. Supreme Court Surveys: 2016 Term. Murr. v.
Wisconsin: Identifying the Proper "Parcel as a
Whole" in Regulatory Takings Cases
Bruce I. Kogan
Roger Williams University School of Law, bkogan@rwu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Property Law and Real
Estate Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
Recommended Citation
Kogan, Bruce I. (2018) "U.S. Supreme Court Surveys: 2016 Term. Murr. v. Wisconsin: Identifying the Proper "Parcel as a Whole" in
Regulatory Takings Cases," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 23 : Iss. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol23/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams
University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

United States Supreme Court
Surveys: 2016 Term
Murr v. Wisconsin: Identifying the
Proper “Parcel as a Whole” in
Regulatory Takings Cases
Bruce I. Kogan*
INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court periodically addresses
claims from individual property owners that their private property
has been taken from them by governmental action for which they
are entitled to be justly compensated under the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.1 Such a case was
decided during the last term of the Supreme Court in Murr v.
Wisconsin, wherein the Court, by a 5–3 majority, held that the
merger provision of an environmental protection zoning statute
did not amount to a taking.2
Takings cases arise either as a result of a direct taking, or a
so-called regulatory taking. Instances where a governmental
entity seeks to occupy or take title to private property are direct

*
Professor of Law at Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The final clause of the Fifth Amendment
reads, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” Id.
2. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949 (2017).
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takings.3 When the government does not seek to physically
acquire or occupy the land, but merely to regulate its use, an
owner may still seek just compensation on the theory that the
regulation in effect took the property by depriving the owner of its
use and value.4 Murr v. Wisconsin is an example of a regulatory
takings case.
The petitioners in Murr were a set of four siblings who owned
two adjacent lots (Lots E and F) along the St. Croix River in
northwest Wisconsin.5 The St. Croix River is a scenic vista, and
has been protected under federal and state law dating back to the
1970s.6 The lots in question were originally acquired by the
petitioners’ parents in 1960 (Lot F) and 1963 (Lot E).7 The
topography of the lots is quite unique.8 Each lot has a higher level
portion that drops off into a steep bluff down to a lower level
portion along the riverfront.9 Additionally, both lots measure
approximately 1.25 acres overall, but because of the waterline and
the steep bank, each has considerably less land suitable for
development.10 During the three decades of the Murr parents’
ownership of these lots, title to Lot E was held in the parents’
names while Lot F was titled in the name of the family plumbing
company.11 The Murr parents built a cabin for their family’s
recreational use on Lot F, but did not undertake any development

3. Direct takings typically proceed by the governmental entity giving
notice of its intention to take or condemn the identified property. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951). Legal challenges to
direct takings normally consist of the owner contesting the amount of
compensation offered as being insufficient to justly compensate the loss
occasioned by the taking. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519
(1992). On rare occasions, the owner may contest the entire condemnation on
the theory that the taking is not for a “public use” as in Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
4. In the seminal regulatory takings case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), Justice Holmes stated, “while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.”
5. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1939, 40.
6. Id. at 1940.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1941.
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of the adjacent Lot E.12
The regulatory scheme that the federal government initiated
in 1972 with the passage of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and
the Lower Saint Croix River Act of 1972 designated the river for
protection against overdevelopment that might undermine the
picturesque grandeur and recreational value of the river and the
surrounding area.13 The Lower Saint Croix River Act required
the State of Wisconsin to enact a management and development
program for the river, which it did by statute,14 and by regulations
promulgated thereunder by the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) by 1976.15 For the area where the Murr lots are
located, the state DNR regulations prevent the use of the lots as
separate building sites unless they have at least one acre of land
suitable for development, which neither Lot E nor Lot F had by
virtue of their unique topography.16 However, like many other
land use regulatory regimes, the DNR regulations grandfathered
pre-existing substandard lots which were in separate ownership
as of January 1, 1976, when the regulations took effect.17 Such
pre-existing non-conforming lots in separate ownership (like lots E
and F while the Murr parents and the family plumbing company
owned them separately) were allowed to be developed as separate
building sites.18 Again the DNR regulations, like many other land
use regulatory regimes, also contained a merger provision which
provides that adjacent substandard lots under common ownership
“may not be ‘sold or developed as separate lots’ since they
separately did not meet the size requirement.”19 The DNR
regulations also required localities such as St. Croix County to
adopt parallel provisions, which it did in its zoning ordinance.20
Eventually the Murr parents transferred these lots to their
four children (the petitioners) in 1994 (Lot F) and 1995 (Lot E).21
12. Id. at 1940, 41.
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(6), (a)(9) (2012).
14. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.27(l) (West 2017).
15. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.01–.09 (West 2017).
16. “Even when combined, the lots’ buildable area is only 0.98 acres due
to the steep terrain.” Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.08(4)(a)(2)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1941.
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Title to both lots was taken in the names of the four Murr
siblings.22 By the mid-2000’s, the cabin on Lot F had fallen into
disrepair, and the Murr siblings sought to sell Lot E to fund the
improvement and movement of the cabin to a different location on
Lot F.23 Neither Lot E nor Lot F contained the minimum one acre
of land suitable for development, and by now they were in common
ownership which triggered the merger provisions of the local
zoning ordinance and the state DNR regulations.24
The Murr siblings sought relief from the strict enforcement of
the regulations by applying for variances from the Saint Croix
County Board of Adjustment (the Board) that would permit the
separate sale or use of the substandard lots, without which they
claimed they would be unable to improve or move the cabin on Lot
F.25 The Board denied the requested variances,
and
the
Wisconsin state courts affirmed the Board’s denial, agreeing with
the Board’s interpretation that the ordinance “effectively merged”
Lots E and F, so that the Murr siblings, “could only sell or build on
the single larger lot.”26 This led the Murr siblings to bring the
inverse takings action in state court, claiming that the state and
county regulations amounted to a regulatory taking by depriving
them of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot
cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot.”27 The trial court
granted summary judgment to the state, finding that the Murrs
retained various options for the use and enjoyment of their land
(they could preserve the existing cabin, relocate the cabin, or
eliminate the cabin and build a new residence on Lot E, on Lot F
or across both lots).28 The trial court also found the Murrs had
not been deprived of all economic value of their property by the
mandated merger of lots E and F, since the appraised values
presented by the state showed only a minimal decrease in market
value (less than 10%) for the merged lots ($698,300) as compared
to what they might be worth as two separate lots ($771,000).29
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 796 N.W.2d
837, 844 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court and
rejected the owners’ request to analyze the effect of the
regulations on Lot E only.30 Instead, the state appeals court held
the takings analysis properly focused “on the Murrs’ property as a
whole”—that is, the merged Lots E and F together.31 From that
perspective, there was not a sufficient deprivation of all or
practically all of the economic value of the Murrs’ property.32 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court did not grant review, which led to the
Murrs’ petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.33
I.

REGULATORY TAKINGS BACKGROUND

Governments have historically taken private property from
individual owners through the exercise of the power of eminent
domain34 when it was perceived that there was a public need for
that property.35 It is logical that the government would not want
to rely solely on the free will, market-based decisions of an
individual owner to agree to sell his property to the government at
a fair price when there might be significant temptation for that
individual to hold out or extort the government in its circumstance
of need. The power of eminent domain was so inherent to the
founding fathers’ notion of government that the first seven articles
that made up the original U.S. Constitution neither mentioned it
nor delegated it to any particular branch of government.36 The
primary goal of the founders at the Constitutional Convention in
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1941.
33. Id.
34. The term “eminent domain” was derived from De Jure Belli Ac Pacis
(On the Law of War and Peace), a legal treatise written by the Dutch jurist
Hugo Grotius in 1625, and is still used in the United States to describe the
power of the government to condemn and appropriate property from
individual owners (the same concept is referred to today in England as
“Compulsory Purchase”). JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 1.12 (3d ed. 2015).
35. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875) (“It has not been
seriously contended during the argument that the United States government
is without power to appropriate lands or other property within the States for
its own uses, and to enable it to perform its proper functions.”).
36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 delegates to Congress the “Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” but this does not
seem to speak with any specificity about takings or eminent domain.
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1787 was to address the shortcomings of the structures of
government
outlined
in
the
predecessor
Articles
of
37
Confederation. Therefore, the original seven Articles of the new
Constitution did not address the relationship between the
individual and the government.38 The first ten amendments to
the Constitution (usually referred to as “The Bill of Rights,”
adopted by Congress in 1789 and ratified by the States by 1791)
were intended to clarify the rights and liberties of individuals or
the people collectively vis-à-vis the government that had not
previously been addressed.39
The Fifth Amendment contains two clauses germane to
individual property ownership and the government’s power to
appropriate such property. The first is the “Due Process” clause,
which continues the theme set out throughout the Fifth
Amendment of what a person shall not be required to suffer at the
hands of the government: “nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”40 The final clause of the
Fifth Amendment then provides: “nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”41 This is the socalled “Takings Clause,” although it is sometimes referred to as
the “Just Compensation Clause” depending upon whether one is
focusing on the government’s power to take or the individual’s
right to be justly compensated for what has been taken.
Direct takings initiated by declarations of intent to condemn
continue even today, but a new type of takings claim—the so37. See John P. Roche, The Triumph of Reform Politics: Overthrowing
the Articles of Confederation, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 809, 809 (1987).
38. See Garrett Epps, The Bill of Rights, 82 OR. L. REV. 517, 518–19
(2003) (noting that the framers did not include these provisions because
individual rights were already provided for by the states).
39. See id.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41. Id. This same notion has inserted itself into the foundational or
constitutional principles of many other nations. For example, the
Constitution of Australia permits the federal government to make laws with
respect to “the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person
for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws.”
Australian Constitution s 51(xxxi). The French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the Citizen mandates that “just and prior indemnity” be paid before
expropriation of private property. 1791 CONST. art. 17. Article eight of the
European Convention on Human Rights and its accompanying protocols
contain similar protections against uncompensated interference with one’s
home and possessions. See E.T.S. No. 5, art. 8.
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called “Regulatory Taking”—joined them in the early years of the
twentieth century.42 The early part of the last century saw the
advent of comprehensive land use planning through the
development of zoning.43 Landowners, alleging pre-zoning
unlimited rights to use their land in any way they chose, or as the
market dictated, brought inverse takings claims on the basis that
the municipality had deprived them of some quotient of their
ownership rights through zoning.44 These challenges generally
failed as in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., where the
Supreme Court upheld zoning as a legitimate exercise of the
government’s “police power” to take reasonable action to protect
the public health, safety, and welfare.45 In part, those early
decisions (and even some much more recent ones) rest on longstanding background principles of nuisance law that already
limited what an owner of land could do on his or her property.46
Under nuisance law, uses that unreasonably interfere with the
reasonable use and enjoyment rights of adjacent landowners
(private nuisance), or the peace, safety and tranquility of the
general public or community (public nuisance) may be enjoined in
equity.47 These inherent background principles suggest that a
government regulation that prohibits a property owner from doing
something that is harmful to the public welfare is not a taking
since the property owner never had the right to use their property
42. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)
(concluding that “if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking”); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992)
(identifying that the language in Mahon gave birth to regulatory takings).
43. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 (1926);
see also 1 Patrick J. Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly, Zoning and Land Use
Controls § 1.02[1] (recounting that “[i]t was not until the twentieth century,
however, that local governments began to develop comprehensive zoning of
uses throughout a community”).
44. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365 (“The ordinance is assailed
on the grounds that it is in derogation of section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal Constitution in that it deprives appellee of liberty
and property without due process of law and denies it the equal protection of
the law, and that it offends against certain provisions of the Constitution of
the state of Ohio.”).
45. Id. at 389–90.
46. See, e.g., id. at 387–88 (explaining that “the law of nuisances . . . may
be consulted, not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its
analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of the [police] power”).
47. Nuisance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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to commit that harm.
Comprehensive community planning such as zoning was not
the only type of regulation of private property owners that
government attempted in the early part of the twentieth century.
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized a valid regulatory taking
claim in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, when interpreting a
coal mining regulation enacted by the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, which required the owners of the sub-surface coal
deposits to remove the coal in such a way so as to guarantee the
vertical support of the owners of the surface lands above the
coal.48 While perhaps a legitimate exercise of the State’s police
power, Justice Holmes ruled that “while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.”49 This simple rule has engendered a
complex body of decisional law in the ninety-five years since 1922.
During that interval, we have seen much more extensive efforts by
government at all levels—federal, state, and local—to adopt
regulations that promote or protect the public health, safety and
welfare.50 Individuals and entities impacted by those regulations
have pushed back by seeking just compensation for what they
claim is a regulatory taking of their private property rights.51
The complexity of “regulatory takings” law that has evolved
since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon has extended to increased
efforts by government bodies to protect environmentally or
culturally sensitive areas by extensive and diverse protective
regulations.52 Government entities regulate private property
owners in many ways and those regulations apply in varying
circumstances and contexts. If the regulation is so burdensome
that it denies the property owner all economically beneficial or
productive use of the property, then it is deemed a “categorical
48. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
49. Id. at 415.
50. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1047 (1998)
(noting that “[m]ore than a century ago, the Court explicitly upheld the right
of States to prohibit uses of property injuries to public health, safety, or
welfare without paying compensation”).
51. See, e.g., id. at 1009 (“Lucas promptly filed suit in the South
Carolina Court of Common Pleas, contending that the Beachfront
Management Act’s construction bar effected a taking of his property without
just compensation.”).
52. See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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taking” that must be justly compensated under the Takings
Clause.53 Short of a complete denial of all productive use,
adjudging whether the extent of the regulation is a permissible
exercise of the police power or goes “too far” requires ad hoc and
perhaps unpredictable facts and circumstances analyses. That
was the case forty years ago in a landowner’s challenge to New
York City’s historic landmark preservation law designed to protect
structures of architectural and cultural significance.54 Even
though the Supreme Court found no unconstitutional taking in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Court
nonetheless gave us the now familiar set of “Penn Central” factors
to be balanced to determine whether regulation has gone “too far”
stating:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,
the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that
have particular significance. The economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the
governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be
found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government, than
when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good.55
...
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated.
In
deciding
whether
a
particular
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in

53. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
54. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115–16
(1978).
55. Id. at 124 (internal citations omitted).
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the parcel as a whole ....... 56
Particularized fact-intensive legal inquiries arise frequently
in
connection
with
regulations
intended
to
protect
environmentally sensitive areas, whether along scenic rivers or in
fragile coastal zones.57 Courts adjudicating the inverse takings
claims that riparian or coastal property owners have brought
must apply the Penn Central factors in resolving a myriad of
questions, such as the value of the land in question, including
whether all economically beneficial or productive use of the land
has been denied; whether an owner’s investment-backed
expectations are “reasonable” and, if so, to what extent does the
regulation interfere.58 Similarly, the courts will inquire into
whether the owner has been deprived of his property when he
retains significant and valuable (albeit reduced) use of the parcel
as a whole despite the regulation.59 Additional questions address
general welfare and fairness, including whether the character of
the regulation was substantially related to promotion of the
general welfare; and whether through the regulation government
is asking only some people to bear public burdens that, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole in
achieving admittedly legitimate public objectives.60
All of this is the gist of the environmental protection
regulatory takings cases such Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, which are cited and
discussed in Murr v. Wisconsin.61 In Lucas, an individual
purchased two oceanfront lots on a South Carolina barrier island
for nearly one million dollars with the intention to build singlefamily homes.62 Two years later, the state amended its beachfront
management legislation to include Lucas’ land in the act’s
prohibition against building any habitable structures.63 While
recognizing that landowners must conform to nuisance control
regulations, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this regulation
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 130–131.
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630–32.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942–43 (2017).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07 (1992).
Id. at 1007.
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amounted to a categorical taking since it deprived Lucas of all
economic benefit of ownership of the parcel as a whole, and thus,
warranted just compensation.64
In Palazzolo, an individual had purchased eighteen acres on
Winnapaug Pond, an environmentally sensitive wetland, in
Westerly, Rhode Island, through a corporate entity in 1959, well
in advance of the Coastal Resources Management legislation first
adopted by Rhode Island in 1971.65 When the corporation
dissolved in 1978, the title to the land was transferred to Mr.
Palazzolo.66 Over the years, Palazzolo submitted several
ambitious development plans for the land to the state Coastal
Resources Management Council, none of which were approved as
submitted.67 Palazzolo sued the state, raising a Lucas-like claim
that he had been totally deprived of all economic benefit from his
ownership of the land.68 On this point, Palazzolo was undercut at
the U.S. Supreme Court by the jointly stipulated facts to the effect
that there was a small developable upland portion of the larger
parcel as a whole worth at least $200,000 upon which a
substantial residence could be built.69 Because the Rhode Island
Supreme Court had not undertaken a full Penn Central analysis,
the case was remanded back to the state courts for further
proceedings.70
64. Id. at 1019.
65. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613–14 (2001).
66. Id. at 614.
67. Id. at 614–15.
68. Id. at 615–16.
69. Id. at 616, 622.
70. Id. at 632. On remand, the Rhode Island Superior Court engaged in a
thorough Penn Central analysis and ruled in favor of the State, holding that:
(1) the owner’s proposed residential development of the property constituted a
public nuisance because it would have resulted in ecological disaster to the
pond the salt marsh bordered; (2) as the development constituted a public
nuisance, the State’s denial of the fill permits could not constitute a taking; (3)
under the public trust doctrine, the portion of the owner’s property that lay
below the 1986 mean high water mark could never be developed; (4) the case
fell under a partial takings inquiry because the State’s coastal development
regulations did not ban all economically beneficial use of the property; (5) the
regulations did not have an adverse economic impact on the owner because
development costs of the property would actually result in an economic loss to
the owner; (6) the owner’s investment-backed expectations were not
realistically achievable, and thus, the third-prong of the Penn Central analysis
was not satisfied; and (7) there was no Fifth Amendment taking. Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, No. WM 88-
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In both of these cases, the impact of the regulations on the
“parcel as a whole” was crucial. If all or substantially all of the
economic value of the parcel of the whole was deprived by the
regulation as in Lucas, then there was a compensable taking.71 If
the landowner retained substantial economic value in the parcel
as a whole (albeit significantly reduced by the regulation), as in
Palazzolo, then there was not a compensable taking.72 Obviously,
identifying the proper “parcel as a whole” may be determinative of
the outcome of the case. In Lucas, the parcel as a whole was the
two oceanfront lots together that the owner could no longer use for
any development.73 In Palazzolo, the parcel as a whole was the
entire eighteen-acre tract (including the dry upland developable
portion) and not just the wetlands portion upon which Mr.
Palazzolo was not permitted to fill and build.74 Similarly, in Murr
v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court had to address “a question that
is linked to the ultimate determination whether a regulatory
taking has occurred: What is the proper unit of property against
which to assess the effect of the challenged governmental
action?”75
II. MAJORITY ANALYSIS IN MURR V. WISCONSIN

Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion recognizes that there are
two competing objectives of the Court’s regulatory takings
jurisprudence, which seeks to balance the right of the individual
private property owner to retain and enjoy the interests and
freedoms at the core of private property ownership against the
government’s well-established power to adjust those rights for the
public good.76 Kennedy then notes that striking that balance
must be driven “by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to
prevent the government from ‘forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.’”77
0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *5–8, *14–15 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005).
71. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
72. 533 U.S. at 632.
73. 505 U.S. at 1006–07.
74. See 533 U.S. at 631–32.
75. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017).
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617–18).
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Striking that proper balance in regulatory takings cases will
require “a careful inquiry informed by the specifics of the case,”
including a comparison of the value of the property both before
and after the imposition of the regulation to measure whether the
regulation has gone too far.78 If all or substantially all of the
economic value of the property as a whole is eliminated as a result
of the regulation, then a taking has occurred.79 If the property
owner is still left with a significant portion of economic value or
beneficial use from the property as a whole although some rights
have been impinged upon and some value lost, then a taking is not
likely to have occurred.80 In order to make that comparison,
Justice Kennedy says that it is necessary to identify “the proper
unit of property against which to assess the effect of the
challenged governmental action.”81 The Murrs argued that the
proper unit of property for this assessment is Lot E, the
undeveloped lot rendered essentially valueless since it can no
longer be separately sold or developed according to the State of
Wisconsin and the County of Saint Croix.82 The State and County
argued that the proper unit of property for this assessment is the
now merged property as a whole, Lots E and F together, which
retained in excess of 90% of their original value, despite the
impact of the regulation.83
This assessment process can be conceptualized as a fraction,
the numerator of which is the value of the property retained by
the owner after the impact of the regulation and the denominator
of which is the value of the property as a whole prior to the
imposition of the regulation. What is no longer in the numerator
is the value of the property rights lost or diminished as a result of
the regulation.84 The Court will not focus only on the property
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1942 (quoting Palazolo, 533 U.S. at 617).
80. See id. at 1943 (citing Palazolo, 533 U.S. at 617).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1941.
83. Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin at 21, 2526, Murr, 137 S. Ct.
1933 (No. 15-214) (noting that the state and county restated the lower court’s
decision affirming summary judgment for the state and county).
84. Cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
497 (1987) (“Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare
the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains
in the property, one of the critical questions is determining how to define the
unit of property ‘whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.’”
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rights targeted by the regulation if the property as a whole
continues to retain substantial value and use.85
Justice Kennedy refers to the identification of the proper unit
of property for this assessment as the “denominator question,”86
and says that “no single consideration can supply the exclusive
test for determining the denominator. Instead, courts must
consider a number of factors. These include the treatment of the
land under state and local law; the physical characteristics of the
land; and the prospective value of the regulated land.”87
The majority opinion says that courts first “should give
substantial weight to the treatment of the land, in particular how
it is bounded or divided, under state and local law,” and also other
legitimate restrictions of state or local law affecting the
“subsequent use and dispensation of the property.”88 In this
regard, the parties had each argued that state and local law
favored their position.89 The Murrs urged the Court to adopt a
presumption that lot lines established under applicable state law
define the relevant parcel in every instance, making Lot E alone
the proper denominator.90 Wisconsin argued that state law had
for forty years included the challenged merger provisions which
would consider the two lots as a single whole, making Lots E and
F combined the proper denominator.91
Justice Kennedy rejected both parties’ request to have the
Court adopt a “formalistic rule to guide the parcel inquiry”
because “[n]either proposal suffices to capture the central legal
and factual principles that inform reasonable expectations about
property interests.”92 Lot boundaries alone cannot be the sole test

(quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1192 (1967))).
85. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944.
86. Id. at 1943 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at
497).
87. Id. at 1945.
88. Id.
89. See Brief for Petitioner at 27–29, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214);
Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin, supra note 83, at 37–43; Brief for
Respondent St. Croix County at 28–35, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214).
90. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947.
91. See Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin, supra note 83, at 1.
92. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946.
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for a variety of reasons identified in the opinion.93 Several states’
lot lines have “varying degrees of formality” and may be adjusted
informally by their owners with “minimal governmental
oversight.”94 In locales where minimum lot size may be more
formally established by state or local law, “there often are existing
lots that do not meet the new requirements,” and it is not
uncommon for local zoning and subdivision laws to include both a
grandfathering of non-conforming lots in separate ownership and
a merger provision for contiguous substandard lots in common
ownership.95
Lot lines are significant, but so are reasonable restrictions
such as merger provisions when adopted as part of a legislative
determination to adjust rights of property owners for a legitimate
public purpose. Merger provisions have been around for nearly a
century and “form part of a regulatory scheme that establishes a
minimum lot size in order to preserve open space while still
allowing orderly development.”96 Justice Kennedy noted that the
“decision to adopt the merger provision at issue here was for a
specific and legitimate purpose, consistent with the widespread
understanding that lot lines are not dominant or controlling in
every case.”97 “Petitioners’ land was subject to this regulatory
burden, moreover, only because of voluntary conduct in bringing
the lots under common ownership after the regulations were
enacted.”98 “As a result, the valid merger of the lots under state
law informs the reasonable expectation they will be treated as a
single [lot].”99
The majority opinion also regarded the “physical
characteristics of the property” as supporting its treatment as a
“unified parcel.”100 The rough and steep terrain, their narrow
shape and the riverfront location of these contiguous lots made “it
reasonable to expect their range for potential uses might be
limited.”101 The Murr siblings “could have anticipated public
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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regulation might affect their enjoyment of their property, as the
Lower St. Croix was a regulated area under federal, state, and
local law long before petitioners possessed the land.”102
As to the element of prospective value of the regulated land,
Justice Kennedy noted that “the prospective value that Lot E
brings to Lot F supports considering the two as one parcel for
purposes of determining if there is a regulatory taking.”103
Although the Murr siblings are prohibited from separately selling
the lots or building separate residences on each lot, this restriction
is mitigated by the offsetting benefits of “using the property as an
integrated whole, allowing increased privacy and recreational
space, plus the optimal location of any improvements.”104 The
combined valuation also “shows their complementarity and
supports their treatment as one parcel.”105
Having thus found that the proper unit of property for
assessing the impact of the merger regulation was Lots E and F
combined, the majority had little difficulty in carrying out the
Penn Central analysis.106 The regulation did not deprive the
Murrs of all or substantially all of the economic value and use of
their property because the reduction in value of combined Lot E
and F was less than ten percent.107 The merger provision,
adopted twenty years before their parents transferred the two lots
to the Murr siblings, meant that they should not have reasonably
expected that they could be separately developed once the siblings
voluntarily accepted title in common ownership.108 The character
of the governmental action was not a physical occupation, but
rather more in the nature of a reasonable regulation adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good
by protecting the scenic beauty and recreational quality of the St.
Croix River.109 Accordingly, the majority opinion upheld the State
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1949.
106. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949–50 (2017) (citing Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
107. Id. at 1949 (first citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); then citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
631 (2001); and then citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019).
108. Id. at 1948.
109. Id. at 1940 (citing WIS. STAT. § 30.27(l) (1973)).
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Court of Appeals decision that there was no taking requiring just
compensation.110
III. DISSENTING ANALYSIS IN MURR V. WISCONSIN

Chief Justice Roberts authored a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Thomas and Alito joined. Justice Roberts primarily
dissents from the methodology that the majority employs to define
the “private property” at issue in takings cases.111 Justice Roberts
says that the Court’s “decisions have, time and again, declared
that the Takings Clause protects private property rights as state
law creates and defines them.”112 For Justice Roberts, this
inquiry is straightforward:
State laws define the boundaries of distinct units of land,
and those boundaries should, in all but the most
exceptional circumstances, determine the parcel at issue.
Even in regulatory takings cases, the first step of the
Takings Clause analysis is still to identify the relevant
“private property.” States create property rights with
respect to particular “things.” And in the context of real
property, those “things” are horizontally bounded plots of
land.113
Instead, Justice Roberts regards the majority as constructing
a “new, malleable definition of ‘private property[,]’ adopted solely
‘for purposes of th[e] takings inquiry,’” which undermines the
Takings Clause protection of individuals forced to bear the full
weight of actions that should be borne by the public at large.114
The perceived malleability arises from the majority’s approach to
the “denominator question,” and its multi-element facts and
110. Id. at 1950.
111. Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing only about the
majority’s methodology of determining the proper parcel to assess in
regulatory takings cases and not the outcome in this particular case; Roberts
begins his dissent by saying that the majority’s bottom-line conclusion that no
taking has occurred does not trouble him since the majority presents a fair
case that the Murrs can still make good use of both lots and that the
challenged ordinance is a commonplace tool to preserve scenic areas for the
benefit of the landowners and the public alike).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1953 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002)).
114. Id. at 1950 (alteration in original).
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circumstances test for defining the private property at issue that
included not only state and local property law concepts, but also
the physical characteristics of the land, the prospective value of
the regulated land, the reasonable expectations of the owner,
background customs, and the whole of our legal tradition.115 The
dissenting opinion suggests that the majority is stacking the deck
in favor of the government by including these other factors in
cases where the individual owns more than one contiguous parcel,
because the majority said that the consideration of these other
factors could easily and improperly be used to argue that the
landowner should have anticipated that his holdings together
would be treated as one parcel.116
Justice Roberts acknowledges that the use of the multielement facts and circumstances analysis from Penn Central is
appropriate in determining whether a particular parcel of private
property as a whole has been so burdened by a regulation to
amount to a regulatory taking, but not at the earlier stage in
which the particular piece of private property is identified or
defined.117 This, for Justice Roberts, is a simper task resolved by
reference to established state property law and for land that
would normally be by the lot boundaries for the parcel affected by
the regulation.118
Since the majority, in Justice Roberts’ view, improperly
conflated the multi-element approach into its method for defining
the particular parcel at issue, he would have remanded the matter
back to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals for a more straightforward
determination of the property at issue before conducting its facts
and circumstances analysis of whether the regulation had gone too
far and amounted to a taking of the separate Lot E.119
Justice Thomas filed a separate dissenting opinion that
questioned whether the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence
arising from the “goes too far” approach of Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon can be reconciled with the original public meaning of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Privileges or

115.
116.
117.
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119.
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Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.120
IV. DISCUSSION

If, as is likely, the Supreme Court is going to continue to
apply the Penn Central factors in takings cases, then the factor
looking at the extent of regulation’s interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations of landowners will continue to be
critical. Landowners will always want to claim that they had
reasonable expectations to use the land for any and all of its
potential economically valuable purposes. They will want to claim
that any regulatory restriction that substantially diminishes the
use of the property should amount to a taking. Government
entities that adopt regulations that restrict use and development
of property will continue to claim that there were legitimate public
purposes for the regulation and the landowner has not been
deprived by the regulation of all economical use and value in most
instances.
The majority opinion in Murr seems consistent with prior
takings jurisprudence that the expectations of the landowners
that they could use their land for any and all economically
valuable purposes are not reasonable expectations in light of the
various factors affecting its potential use such as the land’s
physical characteristics, the prospective value of the land for
different uses, and its treatment under applicable state and local
law.121 These are the factors that Justice Kennedy articulates in
his test for determining the proper parcel as a whole,122 but they
120. Id. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (first citing Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); then citing Legal Tender Cases, 12
Wall. 457, 551 (1871); then citing Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642
(1879); then citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992);
and then citing Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory Takings:
Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but
the Fourteenth Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (2008)).
121. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (stating that
“a prospective enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, can limit the
value of land without effecting a taking because it can be understood as
reasonable by all concerned”); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (noting that
“reasonable expectations must be understood in light of” the common law and
state regulations on property); see also Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 262
(1907).
122. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945 (majority opinion).
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certainly inform the owner’s reasonable investment-backed
expectations. If state and local law restrict the use and
development of the land, then it is not reasonable for the owner to
expect that the land could still be used for a prohibited purpose.
The Supreme Court was focused on the denominator question
in Murr: how should courts identify the proper parcel as a whole
before applying the traditional multi-factor test from Penn Central
to that specific parcel.123 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion says
that no single factor can supply the exclusive test for determining
the denominator and he offers up a multi-factor test including the
treatment of the land under state and local law, the physical
characteristics of the land, and the prospective value of the
land.124 The majority opinion assesses the applicable state and
local law to include the regulatory scheme adopted in 1976, which
limited development of parcels along the St. Croix River with less
than one acre of land suitable for development, and which
mandated merger of substandard lots in common ownership.125
Because the Murr parents in the 1960’s had been prescient in
arranging their ownership of Lots E and F in separate ownership,
the lots, while owned by the parents, were not subject to the
regulation’s restrictions because of the grandfathering provision of
the regulations.126 While the intentions of the Murr parents in
titling the two lots in separate forms of ownership are not
discussed in either the majority or dissenting opinions, it is likely
that the Murr parents had different intentions for what they
planned to do with Lots E and F. Their actions in building a
recreational cabin on Lot F demonstrate their intentions to use
that lot for family enjoyment and recreational occupancy. Their
intentions with respect to Lot E are not so clear, but their actions
in acquiring it three years after acquiring Lot F and not titling it
the same way as Lot F may mean that they always intended to
use, develop, or sell Lot E separately from Lot F. In fact, because
of the grandfathering provisions of the regulations, the Murr
parents could have separately sold or developed Lots E and F,
even after the adoption of the regulations in 1976 and up until
123.
124.
125.
126.
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1995, when the Murr siblings accepted title to both lots in their
four names in common ownership of both lots. At that point in
1995, the lots were in common ownership and could no longer be
separately sold or developed since they separately lacked the
minimum one acre of land suitable for development. When
combined, Lots E and F just about met the one-acre minimum.
Justice Kennedy appears to place a significant amount of
weight to the change in titling of the Murr lots that occurred in
1994 and 1995 stating:
Petitioners’ land was subject to this regulatory burden,
moreover, only because of voluntary conduct in bringing
the lots under common ownership after the regulations
were enacted. As a result, the valid merger of the lots
under state law informs the reasonable expectation that
they will be treated as a single property.127
Chief Justice Roberts in dissent is critical of the majority’s
multi-factor approach wherein “the government can argue that—
based on all the circumstances and the nature of the regulations—
Lots A and B should be considered one ‘parcel,’”128 but the dissent
does not directly or indirectly question the majority’s
characterization of the merger as resulting from the “voluntary
conduct” of the petitioners.
It is true that the Murr parents conveyed the lots out of
separate ownership and into common ownership by their children
in 1994 and 1995.129 That certainly was the voluntary act of the
Murr parents and it could also be said that acceptance of those
conveyances by the petitioner-Murr siblings was voluntary since
donees of gifts do not have to accept them. However, it would
have been highly unusual under the circumstances for the Murr
children to decline the generosity of their parents on account of
the form of title being conveyed. It also was highly unlikely that
the Murr children would have been focused on the impact of the
regulations then in existence on how they should or should not
have accepted title from their parents. Perhaps their attorneys
should have counseled them to continue the separate titling of
Lots E and F with one lot being placed in the names of the four
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 1948.
Id. at 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1941 (majority opinion).
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children and the other in the name of a corporate entity as their
parents had done, and perhaps it was malpractice of the attorneys
not to have done so. However, that does not mean that it was the
intention of the Murr children, in accepting the transfer of both
lots in the names of the four Murr siblings, to have the lots
merged for purposes of future sale and/or development. Justice
Kennedy’s characterization of the petitioners conduct as
voluntarily producing a merger of the two lots into a single lot
seems to miss the question of the intentions of the Murr children,
which should have been more thoroughly examined.
Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the merger as resulting from
the voluntary conduct of the parties also seems inconsistent with a
portion of the Palazzolo opinion. Specifically, it is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s rejection of the State of Rhode Island’s
argument that Mr. Palazzolo lacked standing to challenge the
coastal management regulations that restricted the use of his land
because the regulations were adopted before the land had been
transferred from his solely owned corporation to his name
individually.130 The Supreme Court rejected the State’s claim
that Palazzolo lacked standing because he acquired formal legal
title after the enactment of the CRMC statute.131 The Court was
unwilling “to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause” since
“[f]uture generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable
limitations on the use and value of land.”132
The Murr siblings are that future generation in this case.
Their parents held the lots in separate ownership in 1976 when
the regulations were adopted.133 The Murr parents could have
challenged the application of the regulations to either of their lots
in 1976 as a taking had the regulations not contained the
grandfathering provision for substandard lots in separate
ownership as of the adoption date.134 Grandfathering of preexisting nonconforming properties or uses is a common statutory
element when land use regulations are adopted or amended to
impose restrictions that had not previously applied.135 Without
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
Id.
Id.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940.
WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.08(4) (West 2017).
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grandfathering, governmental entities adopting or further
restricting zoning or other regulatory schemes would be inundated
with takings claims. The Murr parents owned their lots in 1976
and one could say that they also owned the grandfathering rights
conferred by the regulations. It is not clear that the Murr parents
intended to forfeit those grandfathered rights in 1994 and 1995
when they transferred the lots to their future generation children.
The intentions of the parties should have been more thoroughly
examined by the Court before concluding that there was
“voluntary conduct in bringing the lots under common ownership
after the regulations were enacted.”136
CONCLUSION

In Murr v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court took on the question
of how to identify the proper “parcel as a whole” for purposes of
conducting a Penn Central facts and circumstances takings
analysis of the impact of merger provisions in environmental
protection zoning regulations on multiple lots owned by a
family.137 Are the multiple lots to be treated as separate parcels
or are they to be combined into a single parcel as a result of the
merger provisions? As Justice Kennedy notes, the answer to this
preliminary question may be determinative of the Penn Central
analysis.138
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, articulated a new
facts and circumstances test for identifying the proper “parcel as a
whole” (or “denominator”) that includes the treatment of the land
under state and local law, the physical characteristics of the land,
and the prospective value of the regulated land.139 Using those
factors in this case, Justice Kennedy concluded that the proper
parcel to analyze under the Penn Central factors was the merged
Lots E and F as a single combined parcel.140
probably more commonplace than the merger provisions that Justice
Kennedy says are legitimate exercises of government power “with a long
history of state and local merger regulations that originated nearly a century
ago.” Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947.
136. Id. at 1948.
137. Id. at 1952.
138. Id. at 1952–53.
139. Id. at 1945.
140. Id. at 1949.

2018]

REGULATORY TAKINGS

121

Justice Roberts dissented from the methodology utilized by
the majority of constructing a preliminary facts and circumstances
test to be employed in identifying the proper parcel before
conducting the traditional Penn Central factors analysis.141 He
“would stick with [the] traditional approach: State law defines
boundaries of distinct parcels of land, and those boundaries should
determine the ‘private property’ at issue in regulatory takings
cases.”142 The traditional approach, for Justice Roberts, means
that the proper parcel in this case should have been Lot E alone
(although he does agree that ownership of adjacent property may
be taken into account in the subsequent Penn Central analysis).143
The new majority approach may not make takings cases all that
much more complicated than they already are since landowners,
government entities adopting regulatory measures, and courts
adjudicating the effect of those restrictions on private property
will still have to conduct overall facts and circumstances
balancing analyses. The extent of interference with distinct and
reasonable investment-backed expectations will still be a critical
factor. The intentions of the owners and how their investmentbacked expectations are formed when more than one parcel of
private property is involved should be examined more thoroughly
by courts than was done by the majority when it concluded that
the Murr siblings voluntarily submitted their previously
grandfathered lots to the regulatory burden.
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